信息不對稱情況下公益創(chuàng)投的道德風(fēng)險
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-25 11:53
【摘要】：本文在闡述公益創(chuàng)投興起的背景、內(nèi)涵及在國內(nèi)的實踐基礎(chǔ)上,基于舞弊三角理論,以無錫市公益創(chuàng)投為分析對象,通過理順公益創(chuàng)投運作各主體間的關(guān)系,具體分析社會組織在創(chuàng)投項目申報及實施過程中的隱蔽性行為。分析結(jié)果表明:社會組織在公益創(chuàng)投各個階段都存在舞弊的壓力、機會和借口,形成不同程度的道德風(fēng)險,但執(zhí)行報告和內(nèi)評估等問責(zé)工具的有效性并不高。失真的信息直接影響第三方承辦組織的協(xié)調(diào)、督導(dǎo)及評估職能,最終使公益創(chuàng)投的目標無法實現(xiàn)。最后,基于分析結(jié)果,本文以道德風(fēng)險的"機會"要素作為突破點,從社會組織及創(chuàng)投項目、創(chuàng)投項目綜合效應(yīng)評價體系、專家工作等多方面提出政策建議。
[Abstract]:On the basis of expounding the background, connotation and practice of public venture capital in China, based on the theory of fraud triangle, this paper takes Wuxi public interest venture capital as the object of analysis, and straightens out the relationship between the main bodies of public interest venture capital operation. This paper analyzes the hidden behavior of social organizations in the process of application and implementation of venture capital projects. The results show that social organizations have the pressure of fraud opportunities and excuses to form different levels of moral hazard in all stages of public venture capital but the effectiveness of accountability tools such as executive report and internal evaluation is not high. The distorted information directly affects the coordination, supervision and evaluation functions of the third party organization, and ultimately makes the goal of public interest venture capital impossible to achieve. Finally, based on the analysis results, this paper takes the "opportunity" element of moral hazard as the breakthrough point, and puts forward policy suggestions from social organization and venture capital project, evaluation system of comprehensive effect of venture capital project, expert work and so on.
【作者單位】： 江南大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：江蘇高校哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)研究基金指導(dǎo)項目“長三角民營企業(yè)倫理建設(shè)和社會責(zé)任意識教育”(項目編號:2013SJD630077) 江南大學(xué)自主科研項目“新型政企關(guān)系、新興產(chǎn)業(yè)培育與經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)型研究”(項目編號:Z20141080033)
【分類號】：D922.182.3
本文編號：2143741
[Abstract]:On the basis of expounding the background, connotation and practice of public venture capital in China, based on the theory of fraud triangle, this paper takes Wuxi public interest venture capital as the object of analysis, and straightens out the relationship between the main bodies of public interest venture capital operation. This paper analyzes the hidden behavior of social organizations in the process of application and implementation of venture capital projects. The results show that social organizations have the pressure of fraud opportunities and excuses to form different levels of moral hazard in all stages of public venture capital but the effectiveness of accountability tools such as executive report and internal evaluation is not high. The distorted information directly affects the coordination, supervision and evaluation functions of the third party organization, and ultimately makes the goal of public interest venture capital impossible to achieve. Finally, based on the analysis results, this paper takes the "opportunity" element of moral hazard as the breakthrough point, and puts forward policy suggestions from social organization and venture capital project, evaluation system of comprehensive effect of venture capital project, expert work and so on.
【作者單位】： 江南大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：江蘇高校哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)研究基金指導(dǎo)項目“長三角民營企業(yè)倫理建設(shè)和社會責(zé)任意識教育”(項目編號:2013SJD630077) 江南大學(xué)自主科研項目“新型政企關(guān)系、新興產(chǎn)業(yè)培育與經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)型研究”(項目編號:Z20141080033)
【分類號】：D922.182.3
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1 蔡科云;;論政府與社會組織的合作扶貧及法律治理[J];國家行政學(xué)院學(xué)報;2013年02期
2 ;[J];;年期
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